Employer behaviour, etc.

Ronald Dekker, ReflecT, Tilburg University Leuven Summer School 2014: Changing Employment







Understanding Society

Intro

- Ronald Dekker
- Labour economist
 - Econometrics: Erasmus University, Rotterdam
 - Labour economics, labour market policy: Tilburg University (1997-2003 & 2009-now)
 - Labour market and innovation: TU Delft (2001-2009)
- Currently research into:
 - Labour market dynamics
 - Flexibility and security on the labour market, employment security
 - Self-employment, 'spurious' self-employment
 - 'Lower end' of the labour market, inclusive labour markets





My contribution today: largely theoretical/conceptual


- The labour market
- Employer behaviour
- Employability in a flexible labour market
- Inclusion in a flexible labour market
- Policy options: nudge employers to social responsability
- Towards a research agenda with relevance for policy

• Questions/remarks along the way: please don't hesitate to interrupt!





The market ('Economics 101')








Prerequisites for 'perfect competition'

- Infinite number of buyers and sellers
- Zero entry and exit barriers
- Perfect factor mobility
- Perfect information
- Zero transaction costs
- Profit/utility maximization
- Homogeneous products
- Non-increasing returns to scale
- Property rights





The labour market







Prerequisites for 'perfect competition'

- Practically all of them are violated on the 'market for labour'
 - Limited number of employers → monopsony power
 - There are entry costs for starting (or growing) a business
 - Labour is not perfectly mobile
 - Labour market has information problems in abundance.
 - Lots of transaction costs
 - Profit/utility maximalisation? Rational behaviour?
 - Labour is not a homogenous good
 - Economies of scale do exist, particularly with employers, e.g. in combination with capital goods.





Important conclusion

- The labour market doesn't work
- Or..
- The labour market is inherently imperfect
 - See: **Boeri, T, & J. van Ours**, (2008), *The economics of imperfect labor markets*, Princeton University Press, Princeton






Labour demand behaviour of employers

- Not much is known
- How do employers get from 'we have work to do' to 'we want to hire a new employee'?
- What shape does labour demand take?
 - Employment
 - Permanent
 - Temporary/flexible
 - Outsourcing
 - Other firms
 - Solo self-employed





Employer behaviour



Result: labour demand with many different forms of 'labour contracts'


- For employees:
 - Permanent and flexible
- In the Netherlands (and most other countries) the permanent contract is still the 'norm'.
- Depending on the definition, about 65 to 80 percent of the work force in the Netherlands has a permanent job
 - About half of these jobs are part-time
 - A large majority of part-time work is voluntary.
 - About 10% of the workforce is solo self employed






Share of temp. employees

Share of temporary employees (%), EU countries, 2004-2013



Share of 'flexwork' in the active workforce, Netherlands, 1996-2013







Conclusions

- The share of flexible employment in the total workforce is increasing in the Netherlands, mainly through temporary contracts wpfp and self employment
- The transition rate to permanent employment is decreasing for all forms of flexwork.
- The two findings above suggest a growing divide between flexible and permanent segments on the labour market
- This growing divide cannot be attributed to 'composition effects' and/or the business cycle.
- Other explanation: changing employer behaviour, facilitated by institutional changes (F&S Act, 1999, regulations with regard to sick pay, 1996, 2004)





Employer behaviour in using flexible labour

- Hire or source? Permanent or temp?
- Relevant questions:
 - 1. Is the work involved inherently temporary (e.g. replacement, temporary project, seasonal peeks, etc.) → hire, temp
 - 2. Selection/probation period? \rightarrow hire, temp
 - 3. Hiring specific knowledge or skills \rightarrow source, other firm/solo se
 - 4. 'Churning' (lowering costs and risks for the employer, even when the work involved is 'structural') → hire, temp & source
- There is a general notion that the use of flexible labour for 'churning' reasons has become more prevalent over the last 15 years in the Netherlands
- Other countries?





Economic rationality: costs vs benefits?

- Are employers making rational hiring and sourcing decisions?
- Typically an economist would assume this, or assume that employers that don't will be 'out-competed' by other firms.
- But: the labour market is not working!
- Allow for the possibility of irrational employer behaviour
- E.g.: the use of to much flexibility





Cost/benefit analysis for flexible labour

Costs (hypotheses, based upon theory)

- worker
 - Lower wage (in comparison to permanent jobs)
 - Insecurity (mainly in comparison to permanent jobs)
 - Lower investment in skills
- Employer/hiring firm
 - Transaction costs/productivity losses
- The economy
 - Insecurity
 - Lower investment in skills
 - Transaction costs/productivity losses





Cost/benefit analysis for flexible labour

Benefits (hypotheses, based on theory)

- Worker
 - Employment
 - Wage income (in comparison to unemployment)
 - Perspective (in comparison to unemployment)
- Employer/hiring firm
 - Flexibility
 - Risk reduction
 - Productivity gains (?)
- The economy
 - Flexibility
 - Employment?





Balancing costs and benefits

Worker

- Balance is mainly negative
- Mainly costs, fewer benefits
- Exception: 'stepping stone' to permanent employment from unemployment

Employer/hiring firm

- Balance positive in the short-term
- Positive balance less clear in the long run
- Evident short-term cost advantages
- Disadvantages also evident, but more difficult to quantify and more long-term





Balancing costs and benefits

The economy as a whole

- Balance not positive, mainly because hypothesized positive effects on the level of employment are lacking.
- Benefits: A certain degree of flexibility is useful for integrating 'outsiders' into the labour market. Short-term cost advantage for employers.
- Costs: Higher levels of insecurity, more workplace accidents, health risks. Possibly negative effects on productivity/innovation.





Conclusions cost/benefit analysis

- No ponderous arguments for (even) more flexible labour
- Attention is needed for keeping/improving beneficial effects of flexible labour for integrating 'outsiders' into the labour market.
- More research needed with microdata for firms/establishments.
- NB: restrictions on the use of flexible labour could lead to more (spurious) self-employment
- Insecure work 'with real prospects' is better than no work at all





Consequences for employability

- To much flexibility will result in:
 - Higher unemployment incidence → loss of human capital
 - Lower investment in training \rightarrow less growth in human capital
- As a result the average level of employability will decrease and the 'distribution of employability' will be more unequal.





Consequences for inclusion

- Typically, workers with lower levels of human capital will experience:
 - Employers not willing to hire them
 - Employers only willing to hire them on flexible contracts
- Result: risk of downward spiral in socio-economic turns
- The labour market (and employers) is (are) exclusive rather than inclusive and more flexible labour markets could lead to even more 'exclusion'.





Research agenda

- Test hypotheses/assumptions about employer behaviour
 - Qualitative and quantitative research
 - Use longitudinal labour demand data, possibly administrative data
- Possible research questions:
 - What are the determinants of the 'hire-source' decision?
 - What are the determinants of the 'perm-temp' decision?
 - Are employers creating more employment when they have more flexible options?
 - To what extent can employers be 'nudged' to be more 'inclusive?
 - To what extent can employers be 'nudged' to invest more in 'employability'?



